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Abstract 
Are national technology and innovation policies becoming obsolete under the con-
ditions of an increasing internationalization of science, technologies and industry? 
The paper supports the argument that despite globalization and Europeanization, 
national technology and innovation policies remain the most important and effec-
tive level of governance in this area of policy. The argument will be elaborated in 
four steps: firstly, the paper presents a brief overview of the discussions and con-
troversy concerning the future governance of technology and innovation policies. 
Secondly, the effects of changing general conditions on national policies are dis-
cussed, especially the policy implications of the development of new technologies, 
of the internationalization of industry and of the growing importance of public dis-
courses. Thirdly, the relations between the national and the European level of gov-
ernance are analyzed and an answer is given to the question why there has not 
been a significant shift of competencies and resources from the national to the 
European level until now. Against this background and with a special view regard-
ing the German case, the paper finally analyses strategic reorientations, new ele-
ments and instruments of the national technology and innovation policy and dis-
cusses their impact on science, industry, and society. 
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1 Discussions and controversies: 
Globalization, multi-level gov-
ernance and the remaining role 
of national policies 
For a long time major objectives of 
national technology and innovation 
policies have included strengthening 
technological competitiveness, sup-
porting technologies and promoting 
innovation activities on the territory 
that is controlled. And they are still at 
work. In Germany as well as in other 
leading countries, national policy ef-
forts are strongly focused on the aim 
“to enable Germany to hold its own 
against the competition of other lead-
ing technology regions of the world.” 
(BMBF 2000: 14-15) However, are na-
tional policies still able to call the 
tune? What remains of national politi-
cal capabilities to stimulate or shape 
technologies, innovation activities, 
infrastructures and institutions under 
conditions of an increasing interna-
tionalization of knowledge, technolo-
gies and industries?  
In Germany, since the early 1990s 
these questions have been discussed 
mainly in the field of political science 
(see Grimmer et al. 1992; Martin-
sen/Simonis 1995; Gerybadze et al. 
1997; Grimmer et al. 1999; Simonis et 
al. 2001; Grande 2001). The debate 
began with a paradigm shift. The 
conception of a coherent and inter-
vening state with regard to economy 
and society and with this the idea that 
the state could shape or steer 
technological progress (Hauff/Scharpf 
1975) was empirically proven wrong 
(Simonis 1992; Meyer-Krahmer 1999). 
Instead since then three different ar-
guments have been widely acknowl-
edged: 
Firstly, it has been recognized that the 
state is only one player in the technol-
ogy and innovation process among 
other relevant actors. Moreover, it has 
been shown that political decision-
making systematically depends on ex-
ternal expertise and negotiations with 
powerful private actors especially from 
industry and science. Therefore the 
idea of an autonomous and directing 
state was replaced by various concepts 
of a cooperative, interactive, learning 
or negotiating state. 
Secondly, it has been emphasized that 
political authorities are not able to 
plan or steer technologies or innova-
tion activities but instead at best are 
able to provide general conditions and 
‘soft’ incentives for multiple self-
organized and self-interested groups 
of actors. Therefore the idea of an ac-
tive and intervening technology and 
innovation policy was rejected in favor 
of new modes and instruments con-
cerning a more indirect stimulation of 
innovation activities, infrastructural 
and institutional change. 
Thirdly, it has been stressed that the 
complexity of policy-making itself has 
increased significantly over the past 
two decades. Because of Europeaniza-
tion (and regionalization too) national 
technology and innovation policies 
have lost their exclusiveness in the 
policy-making system in favor of an 
emerging multi-level system of gov-
ernance. Therefore the focus of analy-
sis has shifted from national policies 
to the patterns of Europeanization and 
the multi-layer structure of this policy 
field. 
However, behind these stylized facts 
there are still controversial points. This 
concerns especially the two related 
questions which will be discussed in 
this paper. 
The first one deals with the distribu-
tion of resources and competencies 
within the scope of the multi-level sys-
tem of governance. Is the gradual Eu-
ropeanization of innovation and regu-
latory policy activities undermining or 
replacing policies carried out at the 
national level? Or does the nation state 
remain the indispensable and domi-
nant arena of policy activities? (see the 
discussions in Kuhlmann 2001; Edler 
et al. 2003; Edler/Kuhlmann 2005) Or, 
to put it into a normative question: is a 
“much stronger, more focused and 
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integrated policy for industry and 
technology” in the European Union 
necessary to fulfill the conditions of 
globalization and to consolidate 
Europe’s competitiveness in the global 
technology race? (Chesnais et al. 2000: 
249; see also EU-Commission 2000) Or 
is the technological competitiveness of 
Europe even today mainly based on 
the national capabilities, infrastruc-
tures and institutions of their leading 
countries? 
If this last question is answered in the 
affirmative a second tier of questions 
arises concerning the remaining lee-
ways and capabilities of policy-making 
at the national level itself. Does the 
internationalization of knowledge, 
technologies, markets and industrial 
activities lead to a convergence or dis-
solution of national innovation sys-
tems and to a substantial decline or 
erosion of nation states’ capacities in 
technology and innovation policy? 
(Willke 2001; Grande 1994, 2001b; 
Ohmae 1990; Cairncross 1997) Or do 
there remain variations across coun-
tries in innovation, production and 
political systems as well as in national 
innovation policies indispensable in 
providing opportunities, infrastruc-
tures and institutions rendering the 
country attractive for science and in-
dustry? (Porter 1989; Nelson 1993; 
Mowery/Nelson 1999, Archibugi/Iam-
marino 1999)  
The main argument of this paper is 
that national technology and innova-
tion policy is not becoming obsolete. 
National systems of innovation with 
significant differences in technological 
specialization, markets, infrastructures 
and institutions remain the most im-
portant level of innovation activities 
even in the era of globalization. More-
over, national policies especially of the 
large European member states (and 
the US as well) aim at strengthening 
their own technological and economic 
competitiveness in rivalry with other 
countries. This sets limits both to the 
emergence of a European system of 
innovation and the European integra-
tion process in this area. Of course, to 
face the challenges of internationaliza-
tion and to remain functioning, new 
adjustments of national technology 
and innovation policies are necessary. 
They have to open up, learn from and 
adapt to other countries and develop 
new systemic concepts and instru-
ments of policy-making. 
The paper argues along these lines in 
three steps. The following chapter dis-
cusses the effects of changing general 
conditions on the leeways and capa-
bilities of national policies, especially 
the policy implications of the devel-
opment of a new set of core technolo-
gies, of the internationalization of in-
dustry and of the growing importance 
of a watchful and headstrong public. In 
the third chapter the division of com-
petencies between the national and the 
European level of governance will be 
analyzed and the question will be an-
swered, whether there is a significant 
shift of competencies and resources 
from the national to the European 
level or not. Against this background 
and with a special look at the German 
case, the paper will finally sketch stra-
tegic reorientations, new concepts and 
instruments of national technology 
and innovation policy and discuss their 
capability to influence and stimulate 
innovation activities as well as infra-
structural and institutional change. 
 
2 Contexts: Fluid technologies, 
international economy, watch-
ful public and changing gov-
ernance 
To get an impression of the challenges 
technology and innovation policies are 
being faced with, it seems above all 
necessary to work out major changes 
in technology, economy, public per-
ception and governance during the last 
two decades and to sketch their reper-
cussions on policy-making. 
2.1 Fluid technologies 
The portfolio of core technologies has 
changed fundamentally. Since the 
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1980s new information and communi-
cation technologies have transformed 
the entire economy and ultimately the 
rest of society as well. Moreover, ge-
netic engineering, life sciences and 
nanotechnologies are gaining in im-
portance. 
The characteristics of these new cross-
sectoral core technologies, which at 
present dominate the dynamics of in-
novation and sociotechnical change, 
differ from those of established large 
technologies or large technological 
systems (such as nuclear energy, air-
craft and space technologies, and elec-
tricity systems) in many respects. Typi-
cal features of these technologies are 
(Dolata 1992, 2003) 
o their dynamic and fluid state: they 
develop fast, have wide-ranging 
and cross-sectoral potential appli-
cations but are often extremely 
uncertain concerning the direction 
they are going; 
o their often decentralized and 
fragmentary character: different 
from large technologies they 
emerge in countless areas and 
places, are promoted by a large 
number of different actors and can 
be used in numerous contexts; 
o their science-based and multi-
disciplinary profile: they are often 
knowledge-based and interdisci-
plinary and call for intensive col-
laborations both within industry 
and between industry and acade-
mia; 
o the absence of state intervention: 
they are promoted mainly by en-
terprises, scientific institutions, in-
dustrial networks and through co-
operations between industry and 
academia – self-organized patterns 
of development without direct par-
ticipation of state authorities are 
the rule; 
o their international performance: 
the patterns of innovation, coop-
eration and competition are inter-
nationally interwoven. 
These characteristics of new core 
technologies have considerable conse-
quences for policy-making. The direct 
influence of the state on the dizzy dy-
namics and further pathways of these 
complex and small-sized new tech-
nologies is low. They are different from 
large technologies, because the state is 
not necessary as an indispensable in-
vestor, guarantor or customer. More-
over, the state is no longer only faced 
with a small number of well-known 
industrial or scientific actors. Instead it 
has to deal with multiple heterogene-
ous actors and numerous self-
organized and -governed networks of 
innovators (Freeman 1991; Rammert 
1997). 
Under these conditions of private self-
organization and uncertainty all kinds 
of innovation policy activities – rang-
ing from public research programs, 
institutional restructuring of public 
research and incentives to support the 
innovation efforts of firms to regional 
initiatives and regulatory policy – can-
not be developed by an autonomous 
and implemented by a directing state. 
Instead, policy-making of state au-
thorities is more than ever systemati-
cally dependent on the external exper-
tise and competencies of private actors 
which are at the head of the innova-
tion process. A major new challenge in 
this respect is how the competencies 
and resources of new actors (e.g. start-
up companies) can be integrated into 
the already existing patterns of private-
public consultation and corporatist 
decision-making between state au-
thorities, industry and science. 
2.2 International economy 
Moreover, technology and innovation 
policies are faced with considerable 
changes in the patterns of industrial 
innovation activities. In monetary 
terms, an average of 70% of the overall 
research and development in the 
OECD countries is carried out by in-
dustry (BMBF 2004: 489). Three new 
trends are particularly remarkable and 
have significant repercussions on pol-
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icy-making: the step-by-step interna-
tionalization of industrial innovation 
activities, the growing importance of 
technology-based cooperations and 
the rise of new start-up companies as 
catalysts of the innovation process.  
Above all the internationalization of 
companies’ innovation activities has 
significantly increased during the past 
two decades. This trend is most re-
markable in new high-technologies 
(like biotechnology and pharmacy, 
computer, semiconductor and infor-
mation technologies). By now, German 
companies, for instance, spend more 
than a fourth of their overall research 
and development (R&D) budgets 
abroad. Actually, the exceptionally in-
ternationalized German chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals industry invests 
nearly half of their R&D-budget in for-
eign countries. Other large-scale en-
terprises like Siemens or Daimler 
Chrysler do so too (Belitz 2004: 18-25; 
BMBF 2002a: 123-138) What is typical 
of these companies is that they no 
longer carry out only subordinate de-
velopment activities in foreign coun-
tries. Instead they have begun to real-
ize leading-edge research in company-
owned R&D-centers abroad – research 
activities that formerly were highly 
concentrated in their home country 
(Gerybadze et al. 1997; Hack 1998; 
Dolata 1996). However, internationali-
zation doesn’t mean indiscriminate 
globalization, as Ohmae (1990), Cairn-
cross (1997) or Willke (2001) have sug-
gested. Companies don’t allocate their 
R&D-activities evenly and everywhere 
but concentrate them worldwide in a 
few leading regions or districts which 
are close to scientific excellence and 
(future) lead markets (Feldman 1994; 
Patel 1995; Heng/Schaaf 2002; Carls-
son/Mudambi 2003). Instead of a loca-
tionless globalization very selective 
and a regionally concentrated patterns 
of internationalization are characteris-
tic of industrial R&D and innovation 
activities.  
A second remarkable trend of the 
1990s is the rapid increase of collabo-
rations both within industry and be-
tween industry and academia – espe-
cially in new high technologies. At the 
top of the trend is the pharmaceuticals 
industry. Today the large companies of 
this industrial sector spend between 25 
and 30% of their research budgets on 
the support of external cooperations, 
whereas until the 1980s the same 
companies realized their research ac-
tivities nearly exclusively in-house 
(Dolata 2003: 175-243). The systematic 
constraint towards cooperation results 
from the extraordinary dynamics of the 
generation of knowledge, the fast rate 
of technological change and the multi-
disciplinarity of research and devel-
opment projects. These complex pat-
terns of innovation are, even in large 
enterprises, impossible to handle 
purely by in-house capacities (Hage-
doorn 1996; Hagedoorn et al. 2000; 
OECD 2000). Besides the expansion of 
company-owned capacities and capa-
bilities (Pavitt/Patel 1999), they require 
the simultaneous recourse to com-
pany-external knowledge, know-how 
and competencies. Therefore today 
“the locus of innovation will be found 
in networks of learning, rather than in 
individual firms.” (Powell et al. 1996: 
116; also Freeman 1991) 
A third new trend has to be added. Be-
sides large enterprises small and re-
search-intensive start-up companies 
have been established as pioneers, 
brain trusts and driving forces of the 
innovation process and the early 
commercialization of new technologies 
– not only in the U.S., but during the 
1990s also in Western Europe. The 
personal computer and its operating 
systems, the early commercialization 
of genetic engineering, and the inter-
net, for instance, all got under way not 
by saturated large enterprises but by 
new entrants (Ichbiah/Knepper 1991; 
Dolata 1996; Mowery/Nelson 1999; 
BRIE-IGCC E-conomy Project 2001). As 
venturesome, research-intensive and 
unconventional operating units they 
stimulate not only the innovation 
process itself, but at the same time 
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have become important external re-
sources and cooperators for big indus-
try, even though the bulk of the entire 
industrial R&D expenses still falls to 
large enterprises – in Germany ap-
proximately 80% (Legler et al. 2004: 
15-24) – and only very few start-up 
companies conduct leading-edge re-
search and turn out to be commer-
cially successful innovators (Parker 
1999).  
Altogether these trends – internation-
alization, collaboration and the emer-
gence of new industrial actors – have 
considerable impact on the outline of 
technology and innovation policies. 
The formerly close connection be-
tween domestic enterprises, the na-
tional development of technologies 
and national policies has opened up. 
The addressees of national policy ini-
tiatives are no longer exclusively the 
well-known national champions and 
the medium-sized enterprises at home. 
Instead the state has to provide gen-
eral conditions and incentives that are 
attractive for increasingly internation-
ally operating domestic companies as 
well as for foreign enterprises which 
intend to invest in the respective coun-
try. Moreover, it has to develop new 
incentives that aim at supporting the 
emergence and stabilization of new 
start-up firms. And finally, it has to 
recognize that today the locus of inno-
vation will be found “in the interstices 
between firms, universities, research 
laboratories, suppliers, and custom-
ers” (Powell et al. 1996: 118) and 
therefore has to promote initiatives 
designed to stimulate cooperative ar-
rangements and networking as well as 
technology transfer from academia to 
industry.  
The pattern of a highly selective and 
regionally clustered internationaliza-
tion of companies’ research and inno-
vation activities not only interweaves 
national (and regional) locations closer 
than ever before but at the same time 
places them into fierce competition 
and rivalry. Under these conditions, 
nation states are under pressure to 
compete with each other and struggle 
for locational decisions and invest-
ments of both domestic and foreign 
enterprises and scientists, too (Jessop 
2002). For this purpose above all, they 
have to offer excellent research condi-
tions, sophisticated innovation infra-
structures and prosperous lead mar-
kets to companies. 
2.3 Sensitive public 
During the last two decades the public 
perception and use of new technolo-
gies has changed too. Starting with the 
fierce protest against nuclear energy, 
almost every new technology has been 
perceived ambivalently and has been 
widely discussed in public. Moreover, 
the end user make use of the opportu-
nities of new technologies often in a 
headstrong and unexpected way 
(Bauer 1995; Bauer/Gaskell 2002). 
In contrast to the 1970s and 1980s, 
today public unease concerning new 
technologies is not only spurred on by 
well-organized protest movements, 
non-governmental organizations and 
environmental and consumer associa-
tions but is increasingly expressed by 
collective actors which are non-
organized and hardly ever institution-
alized, such as citizens, voters and 
consumers. They remain unimportant 
as long as they do not develop shared 
user preferences or problem percep-
tions concerning new technologies. 
But if so, they are no longer only pas-
sive addressees of new technological 
supplies but instead can exercise con-
siderable influence on the design and 
portfolio of new products as well as on 
public policy (Dolata 2003: 31-33). 
On the one hand collective actors do 
appear as headstrong users and selec-
tive consumers. This is the case with 
many new everyday applications of 
media, information and communica-
tion technologies. Often final custom-
ers and users exert an influence on 
new technological supplies by using 
them very selectively or contrary to all 
expectations. This can lead both to 
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failure or (sometimes unexpected) suc-
cess of new products (Kubicek 1997). 
On the other hand, collective actors 
can also be skeptical, watchful citizens 
and discerning consumers, the major-
ity of which may not accept new tech-
nologies or specific applications. This 
is for instance partially the case with 
genetic engineering, especially with 
new applications in agriculture and the 
food industry (Hampel/Renn 1999).  
These opportunities of public interven-
tion do not only have repercussions on 
the strategies of certain industries, 
they can also put political authorities 
under pressure. Public policy is not 
only forced to create initiatives and 
incentives which aim at strengthening 
countries’ economic and technological 
competitiveness, it is at the same time 
faced with an enlightened public which 
no longer accepts technological pro-
gress in general but discusses and 
sometimes refuses new technologies. 
Therefore, policy has also to develop 
new modes of mediation of social con-
troversies concerning new technolo-
gies. It has to ensure transparency, 
safety, consumer protection and par-
ticipation as well. 
2.4 Multi-level governance 
Finally, the architecture of innovation 
policy-making itself has also changed. 
Since the early 1980s the most re-
markable new development in this re-
spect has been the gradual formation 
of an original European technology, 
innovation and regulatory policy. Since 
then, national policy initiatives have 
been increasingly supplemented by 
and partly intertwined with corre-
sponding activities of the European 
Union. The formerly unchallenged 
dominance and exclusiveness of na-
tional authorities and policies has 
been restricted in favor of a co-
evolution and co-existence of different 
levels of innovation policy making.  
What does co-evolution and co-
existence mean? Are we witnessing an 
intensified European integration and a 
significant shift of governance and pol-
icy-making from the national to the 
European level? Or can we observe 
only loose combinations of fragmented 
levels of governance in which national 
policies and arenas still play the domi-
nant role? To answer this first tier of 
questions I will now analyze the dy-
namics, scope and breadth of Euro-
pean integration in the field of innova-
tion and regulatory policy and give 
reasons for the argument that the na-
tional level of policy-making still re-
mains the most important one. 
 
3 Architectures: European Inte-
gration, National Systems of 
Innovation and International 
Rivalries 
3.1 European Integration? 
Without doubt the European Commu-
nity has reached a new level of gov-
ernance and the Commission of the 
European Communities has been es-
tablished as a new and important actor 
in technology, innovation and regula-
tory policy during the past two dec-
ades. This has happened mainly in two 
areas: in the development of legal 
frameworks for research, production 
and commercialization of new tech-
nologies, and in the implementation of 
European programs for research and 
technological development. Moreover, 
with the recent approach “Towards a 
European research area” launched in 
2000, the Commission started a new 
attempt to coordinate European, na-
tional and regional innovation policies 
in a better way (European Commission 
2000). 
Responsibilities for the set up of legal 
frameworks and regulations of tech-
nologies have shifted heavily from the 
national to the European level since 
the late 1980s. Meanwhile, the deci-
sions concerning legal and regulatory 
aspects take place mainly at the Euro-
pean level – and are reflected in a 
whole string of relevant initiatives, 
guidelines and directives that are un-
Ulrich Dolata, Reflexive Stimulation 66 
 
der way or have been enacted by the 
European Union (for instance in bio-
technology and chemicals regulation 
or in patent protection). As a result, 
the negotiations dealing with legal and 
regulation aspects have also shifted 
from the national to the European 
governance level – with the European 
Commission and the European Parlia-
ment, the governments and responsi-
ble ministries of the Member states as 
well as the relevant pressure groups of 
the European lobbying process as in-
fluential negotiating parties. However, 
this significant Europeanization of le-
gal activities and regulations has not 
led to a dramatic loss of influence of 
national authorities, actors and con-
troversies up to now. As for instance 
the development of regulations for 
biotechnological research, production 
and marketing or the discussions 
about a renewed European chemicals 
regulation show, national actors and 
interests are closely involved in Euro-
pean negotiations, are often able to set 
the tone, to initiate and to speed up as 
well as to protract or to block the 
European decision-making process 
(Dolata 2003a; Hampel 2005; 
Jacob/Volkery 2005). 
 
Table 1: Budget of the EU Framework Programs for research and technological 
development (FPs) in comparison with the public R&D funds of the Member states 
 
 
 Budget FPs 
(billion Euro) 
Share of FPs on 
total EU budget 
(in %) 
Public R&D 
funds of the 
EU Member 
states (billion 
Euro) 
Share of RP-
budget on pub-
lic R&D funds 
of the Member 
states (in %) 
 
1. FP 
2. FP 
3. FP 
4. FP 
5. FP 
6. FP 
 
1984 – 1987 
1987 – 1990 
1990 – 1994 
1994 – 1998 
1998 – 2002 
2002 - 2006 
 
3.75 
5.37 
6.60 
12.30 
14.96 
17.50 
 
2.41 
3.15 
4.04 
4.02 
4.15 
- 
 
110.5 
128.1 
198.9 
220.1 
251.7 
- 
 
3.4 
4.2 
3.3 
5.6 
5.9 
- 
Source: Rammer et al. 2004: 170 
However, in the field of European 
technology and innovation policy such 
a comprehensive shift is scarcely to be 
identified up to the present – not even 
as an outcome of the recent European 
research area initiative.  
Of course, the European Union has 
become a serious player in technology 
and innovation policy, too. Since the 
early 1980s the EU has established 
ever increasing Framework Programs 
(FPs) for research and technological 
development that are targeted at a 
number of advanced technologies, par-
ticularly including sectoral programs 
to support research in information and 
communication technologies and the 
life sciences. Furthermore, FPs are 
aiming to stimulate scientific coopera-
tion within Europe and to strengthen 
the transnational networking between 
the actors, institutions and regions 
involved (Peterson/Sharp 1998; Borrás 
2003; Prange 2003). 
Even though the total amount of the 
European Union’s spending on re-
search and technological development 
has increased substantially through to 
the present, it cannot keep up with the 
public funds for research and devel-
opment (R&D) in the Member states: 
as table 1 shows, the 17.5 billion Euro 
budget of the latest framework pro-
gram meets with only approximately 
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6% of the total public funds for R&D in 
the Member states, of which about 
75% are spent in Germany, France, the 
UK and Italy (BMBF 2002: 338). The 
European funds have gained in impor-
tance in supporting research and infra-
structures in the smaller and weaker 
Member states, but have only a minor 
impact on the national innovation sys-
tems of the leading ones (Pavitt 1998). 
More important is the fact that Euro-
pean policy has not yet been able to 
integrate the fragmented national re-
search infrastructures, to coordinate 
the various regional, national and 
European policy activities effectively 
and to develop a coherent European 
technology and innovation policy 
which would be mandatory on the 
Member states (Kuhlmann 2001; 
Grande 2001a). In 2000 the European 
Commission itself stressed this nega-
tive record by stating that “it cannot be 
said that there is today a European 
policy on research. National research 
policies and Union policy overlap 
without forming a coherent whole.” 
Furthermore: “Above the European 
research effort as it stands today is no 
more than the simple addition of the 
efforts of the 15 Member States and 
the Union.” (EU-Commission 2000: 7) 
It seems that the European research 
area initiative launched in 2000 will 
not be able to change this situation 
fundamentally. The suggestions made 
with this new approach were not far-
reaching. Although the Commission 
was aware of the lack of coherence 
and coordination of national and 
European technology and innovation 
policies, the only suggestions made in 
this respect were to develop a bench-
marking system of national research 
policies, to improve science and tech-
nology foresight, statistics and indica-
tors, and to strengthen and intensify 
the European networking of existing 
national research centers as well as 
public-private partnerships. In contrast 
to the past, the Commission did not 
claim once again far-reaching new 
competencies in technology policy but 
instead emphasized its role as a cata-
lyst and soft coordinator of activities 
which (should) take place mainly on 
the national and sub-national level 
(EU-Commission 2000, 2002, 2003; see 
also Edler et al. 2003; Edler/Kuhlmann 
2005). This is an remarkable restraint 
which recognizes the persistent domi-
nance of national resources within the 
EU as well as the fact that even though 
the industrial innovation activities are 
highly internationalized, the national 
and sub-national innovation infra-
structures remain the most important 
ones concerning the production of 
new knowledge and technologies.  
To sum up, the future role of the Euro-
pean Union as a player in technology 
and innovation policy seems to be 
confined to the forecasting of techno-
logical developments and the bench-
marking of national policies as well as 
to the stimulation of European net-
working in science and technological 
development. Paradoxically, concen-
trating on this restrained scope of du-
ties may turn out to be a successful 
strategy for further European integra-
tion – not only because it takes into 
account national self-centeredness but 
particularly because it acknowledges 
the necessity of distinct national and 
sub-national policies. Therefore one 
can hardly expect the emergence of a 
European technology and innovation 
policy which could replace or compete 
with the national policies at eye level. 
It seems that the recent initiatives un-
dertaken will not remove the existing 
balance between the European and 
national responsibilities and compe-
tencies in this policy field. 
3.2 National systems of innovation 
and international rivalries 
There are two complementary explana-
tions for this restrained scope of Euro-
pean integration and the persisting 
dominance of national policies in this 
arena. 
Firstly, international as well as re-
gional patterns of innovation are 
chiefly structured and formatively in-
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fluenced by the distinct peculiarities of 
national systems of production, inno-
vation and policy-making. Despite in-
creasing interweaving and penetration 
there is little empirical evidence for a 
strong convergence of national sys-
tems or for the emergence of a coher-
ent European system of innovation. 
Secondly, the leading countries – 
among others especially the U.S., 
Germany, France, the U.K and Japan – 
clearly compete with each other. 
Against the background of a very 
selective and regionally concentrated 
internationalization of industries’ in-
novation activities, national policies 
are forced to compete for technologi-
cal leadership as well as for the most 
excellent and attractive innovation-
oriented infrastructures as major pre-
requisites for their competitive advan-
tage. 
Especially the research on national 
systems of innovation (Nelson 1993; 
Edquist 1997; Mowery/Nelson 1999; 
Balzat/Hanusch 2004) and the varieties 
of capitalism (Soskice 1999; Hollings-
worth 2000; Hage/Hollingsworth 2002) 
has shown convincingly, that major 
differences still exist between national 
systems of production, innovation and 
policy-making. These differences range 
from distinct national research and 
education systems, unique structures 
of industry and inter-firm collabora-
tions through to the financial systems, 
the demand and market structures or 
the patterns of negotiation, public per-
ception and political moderation of 
controversies about new technologies. 
Of course, the national systems are 
closely intertwined in the age of inter-
nationalization and national policies 
try to learn form and adapt to each 
other. But they do so in their own 
unique way and against the back-
ground of very different national inno-
vation cultures, patterns of technologi-
cal specialization, institutional con-
texts and political systems. And they 
try to sharpen unmistakably national 
or rather regional innovation profiles 
and strengths which enable the coun-
try to stand the test of international 
rivalry and competition (Diederen et al. 
1999; Kuhlmann 1999, 2001; Borrás 
2004; Senker/van Zwanenberg 2001). 
All in all there is little evidence so far 
of advanced tendencies towards a uni-
formity of national systems or towards 
the emergence of a coherent European 
system of innovation. Instead, the ter-
ritories of the great nation states re-
main the most relevant areas of inno-
vation with diverse and unique pro-
files. Otherwise the highly selective 
and regionally concentrated locational 
decisions and investments of industry 
would make no sense: enterprises do 
not go anywhere but instead put out 
feelers and make very specific loca-
tional choices. 
Against this background it should be 
comprehensible why core elements of 
technology and innovation policies 
still remain nationally-based – even 
within the European Union. If national 
areas of innovation with distinct infra-
structures, patterns of specialization, 
institutions and cultures are still the 
most important ones, their moderniza-
tion and readjustment right at the 
front has to be pushed forward by na-
tional political authorities. And if the 
internationalization of industrial re-
search, development and innovation 
activities is not viewed as a process of 
locationless globalization but instead 
is identified as a highly selective proc-
ess restricted to a few top regions and 
lead markets worldwide, the great 
Member states of the European Union 
are not only competing with their non-
European rivals (like the U.S. or Japan) 
but also with their European ones – 
and therefore pay careful attention not 
to reduce the remaining leeways of 
national policies by delegating core 
competencies to the European Union 
(Banchoff 2002).1 
                                                       
1 In two interim balance sheets of the 
European Research Area Initiative the EU-
Commission had to admit that „the initia-
tive in its current form seems to be ham-
pered, however, by insufficient participa-
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4 National leeways and profiles:   
Readjustments of technology 
and innovation policy in 
Germany 
If strategies and policies that aim at 
getting competitive advantage are still 
the domain of national initiatives, ne-
gotiations and decisions, the second 
tier of questions concerning the re-
maining leeways and capabilities of 
national technology and innovation 
policies has to be answered. Are the 
competencies and capacities of na-
tional policies being eroded, regarding  
the background of the indisputable 
internationalization of markets, firms 
and technologies? Or do national poli-
cies remain a relevant factor in stimu-
lating and shaping technologies, infra-
structures and institutions? 
4.1 Limits and new challenges of in-
novation policy-making 
The findings so far should have sup-
ported to idea that the capacities of 
innovation policy-making are limited 
to the provision of general conditions 
for strongly self-organized actors and 
private contexts of research, develop-
ment, production and use of new 
technologies. In contrast to this, po-
litical authorities cannot steer or influ-
ence the dynamics of technological 
development itself, of industrial inno-
vation activities or of scientific re-
search in a formative way. Moreover, 
the regionally clustered internationali-
zation of the innovation activities of 
industry has strong repercussions on 
the leeways and the focus of national 
policies: above all they have to develop 
new concepts and instruments which 
aim at providing infrastructural, insti-
tutional and regulatory conditions that 
                                                                 
tion of the Member States. This is reducing 
the impact of the activities being under-
taken, thereby jeopardizing the chances of 
the project achieving its objectives: the 
creation of a genuine ‚Internal market in 
research‘ and the establishment of genuine 
coordination of national research policies.“ 
(EU-Commission 2002: 3; see also EU-
Commission 2003) 
are attractive for both domestic and 
foreign enterprises. 
Therefore, the former alignment of 
national research and technology poli-
cies on the funding of specific technol-
ogy programs, the support of national 
champions and the concentration on 
large technologies (Meyer-
Krahmer/Kuntze 1992) has become too 
limited in several respects. 
The rise of new core technologies such 
as information and communication 
technologies, biotechnology or 
nanotechnologies has qualified the 
importance of large technologies as 
cornerstones of national technological 
competitiveness and as major forces of 
technological change. Accordingly, 
policy is not only forced to readjust the 
portfolio of supported technologies 
but also has to develop new concepts 
and instruments to support this new 
set of core technologies which are de-
veloping in a more decentralized way 
and are being encouraged by numer-
ous private actors and fluid networks 
of innovators (Rammer et al. 2004).  
However, today the attractiveness and 
competitive advantage of a country no 
longer depends mainly on the direct 
public support of new technologies. 
Unmistakable national innovation 
landscapes with competitive regional 
and sectoral technology clusters, ex-
cellent research conditions, effective 
systems of technology transfer and 
future lead markets have become cru-
cial factors for the competitiveness of 
countries as well as for locational de-
cisions and investments of industry 
(Meyer-Krahmer 2005). Accordingly, 
technology and innovation policy ac-
tivities have to open up and to concen-
trate their efforts more strongly on the 
stimulation and restructuring of tech-
nology-related infrastructures and in-
stitutions. 
The former concentration of policies 
on the support and protection of na-
tional champions has also become too 
limited. Against the background of the 
described patterns of internationaliza-
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tion, national policy has also to woo 
foreign enterprises which intend to 
reinforce their own position through 
investments in the host country. 
Moreover, besides the support of large 
enterprises, national policy is forced to 
develop specific initiatives and incen-
tives to support the emergence of tech-
nology-based start-up firms which are 
gaining in importance as locational 
factors. And finally, the strong state-
protection of national champions or 
industries in the past has widely 
proved to be counterproductive in 
stimulating innovations as well as in 
strengthening the national economic 
and technological competitiveness of 
industry. This applies especially to new 
core technologies which are best de-
veloped in the environment of fierce 
competition. “Successful national in-
dustries tend to be ones where in-
tensely competitive domestic rivalries 
push each other to excel.” (Lawton 
1999: 42; see also Monopolkommis-
sion 2004).2 
4.2 New adjustments of national 
technology and innovation policy 
Since the mid 1990s, the governments 
of the leading states have reacted to 
these limits and new challenges with 
remarkable readjustments of their 
technology and innovation policies. 
Despite all variability in the points of 
departure, featured concepts and in-
struments, they aim at strengthening 
unmistakable national and regional 
innovation landscapes by stimulating 
competition as well as networking be-
tween the actors involved and by re-
                                                       
2 Timothy Bresnahan and Franco Malerba 
argue similarly with respect to the protec-
tionist policy of individual European gov-
ernments concerning the computer indus-
try in the 1970s and 1980s: „The effect of 
protection by individual European govern-
ments was to keep an uncompetitive Euro-
pean computer industry alive and sheltered 
from destruction by IBM. These barriers to 
exit, however, did not lead European firms 
to launch major policies and investments 
able to increase their innovativeness and 
competitiveness internationally.“ (1999: 
102) 
structuring the infrastructures and in-
stitutions relevant for innovation 
(Larédo/Mustar 2001; Rammer et al. 
2004). 
In Germany this new set up of priori-
ties in technology and innovation pol-
icy can be observed in particular in 
four related areas.3 
Firstly, the political support of struc-
tural change in the national patterns of 
technological specialization towards 
new research- and knowledge-
intensive technologies and branches of 
industry has been strengthened. How-
ever, the featured initiatives and in-
struments are not new or spectacular. 
They concentrate on the implementa-
tion of research programs which fea-
ture new core technologies, especially 
information and communication tech-
nologies, biotechnology and life sci-
ences, nanotechnologies, new materi-
als and environmental technologies. In 
2004 in Germany 20.1% (in 1993: 
17.1%) of the total (civil and military) 
federal funding on science, research 
and technology was spent to support 
these new clusters of technology. In 
contrast the federal funding of large 
technologies (especially nuclear energy 
and nuclear fusion, aviation and space 
technologies, military projects) has 
gradually decreased (from 29% in 1993 
to 20.1% in 2004), even though these 
sectors are still of importance in the 
profiles of federal support (data calcu-
lated on the basis of BMBF 2004: 616-
621 [table 8a]). 
Secondly, the public support of re-
search, development and innovation in 
industry has changed significantly. In 
general, the federal state has with-
drawn from financing industrial R&D 
                                                       
3 For more detailed empirical findings and 
statistics see the annual reports on the 
technological specialization and competi-
tive advantage of Germany: BMBF 2000a, 
BMBF 2003; BMBF 2004 and Grupp et al. 
2004. A comparative analysis of recent 
trends in technology and innovation policy 
including Germany, the U.S., the U.K., 
France, Japan and Finland can be found in 
Rammer et al. 2004. 
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directly in a remarkable way. While at 
the end of the 1970s the public share 
of total industrial R&D expenses 
amounted to 14%, at the beginning of 
the new millennium in Germany the 
federal state financed not more than 
3.5% of the total R&D-expenses of in-
dustry (Legler et al. 2004: 32f.). More-
over, compared with the public sup-
port of large enterprises, the public 
support and stimulation of small and 
medium sized enterprises, especially of 
new technology-based start-up firms, 
has gained in importance. Although 
even today with approximately 80% 
the bulk of the remaining public sup-
port of industrial R&D falls to large 
enterprises, especially to the aviation 
and space industry, in relative terms 
since the mid 1990s small enterprises 
have benefited more and more from 
public financial support. At present, 
public money amounts to 8.5% of the 
total R&D-expenses of small firms, 
whereas on average only 2.5% of the 
R&D of large enterprises (i.e. compa-
nies with more than 5000 employees) 
is financed by the state (Legler 2004: 
32f.). This is completed by specific 
programs of gaining importance which 
support the founding and financing of 
new start-up firms (BMBF 2002b: 16f.; 
BMBF 2004: 200-2003). All things con-
sidered, innovation policy initiatives 
have realized that small enterprises 
and especially technology-based start-
up firms play an important part as 
catalysts of innovation, as locational 
factors and as potential external re-
sources and partners for big industry. 
Thirdly, since the mid 1990s, national 
policy has begun to take regions as 
important elements of national 
innovation systems seriously and 
therefore has developed new concepts 
and instruments of a region-oriented 
technology and innovation policy 
which makes use of the regional level 
in order to pursue national goals. It 
focuses on three targets: generating 
new regional high-technology clusters, 
stimulating inter-regional competition 
for science, technology and innova-
tion, and improving regional networks 
of innovators as well as the function-
ing of regional innovation systems 
(Braczyk et al. 1998; Dohse 2003, 
2005). In Germany, the successful pro-
totype of this new area of technology 
and innovation policy was the so-
called BioRegio Contest which started 
in the mid 1990s and was as subse-
quent initiatives, too, designed to 
transform a dormant sector into one 
intended to be globally competitive by 
stimulating biotech firm start-ups, the 
growth of existing companies, the pro-
vision of venture capital and the net-
working of regional actors and institu-
tions. The instrument, which was then 
new but is meanwhile widely applied, 
was the invitation to a contest which 
aimed at stimulating new high-
technology clusters and regional cen-
ters of excellence by putting the par-
ticipating regions in an inter-regional 
competition for additional federal 
funding. 
Finally, since the late 1990s political 
measures have been initiated to stimu-
late structural changes of the public 
science and research infrastructures 
and institutions. They aim at a 
stronger competition within the public 
research system and between their 
institutions as well as at a faster rate 
and more efficient system of knowl-
edge and technology transfer from sci-
ence to industry (Etzkowitz 2003). 
Among the public initiatives are the 
introduction of periodical evaluations 
and the hierarchical reorganization of 
universities and other public research 
institutions as well as the intensifica-
tion of competition for financial re-
sources. Moreover, especially the new 
instrument of public competitions is 
widely used to stimulate the clustering 
of first-class research in a few national 
lead projects (so-called "Leitprojekte") 
and centers of excellence (so-called 
"Kompetenzzentren"). Additionally, the 
public support of research projects has 
been strongly focused on applied re-
search and on the intensification of 
collaborations between public re-
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search institutions and enterprises 
(BMBF 2004: V-XVI). As a result the 
pressures on universities and other 
public research institutions to compete 
with each other, to bundle their re-
sources in lead projects and centers of 
excellence, to legitimate scientific re-
search by their economic relevance 
and to contribute to economic devel-
opment have increased significantly 
(Rammer et al. 2004: 132-142). 
4.3 Reflexive stimulation or disjointed 
incrementalism? 
These new adjustments of national 
technology and innovation policy are 
towering above the former concentra-
tion on the political shaping of tech-
nologies and national industries, the 
financing of large technologies and the 
protection of national champions. In-
stead, the renewed approach appears 
to be more indirect and context-
oriented: above all, it aims at restruc-
turing national (and regional) infra-
structures, institutions and innovation 
landscapes which are attractive both 
for scientists and enterprises from 
wherever. The featured new instru-
ments for that purpose are contests 
which stimulate competition between 
research institutions or regions as well 
as initiatives which support the 
clustering of research in national (or 
regional) centers of excellence and the 
networking between scientific and in-
dustrial actors. The addressees of 
these initiatives are no longer mainly 
domestic large enterprises but also 
their foreign counterparts, new start-
up firms and (regional, industrial or 
academic-industrial) networks of in-
novators which often develop only af-
ter the implementation of correspond-
ing public initiatives. 
Within the inevitable limits of innova-
tion policy-making described above, 
the readjusted policy is definitely able 
to cause structural effects. In Germany 
(as well as in other European coun-
tries) it has stimulated the emergence 
of visible sectors of start-up firms 
(Dolata 2003). Moreover, it has forma-
tively contributed to the emergence of 
new regional high-technology clusters 
and the regional networking of actors 
(Dohse 2003). And finally, it has forged 
a far-reaching restructuring of the 
public research and science system 
towards increasing competition and 
clustering, academic-industrial coop-
eration and technology transfer (BMBF 
2004: 473-525). What at first sight ap-
pears as a decline of policy-making 
capacities turns out to be a truly indi-
rect but none the less active and effec-
tive contribution to the readjustment 
of general conditions concerning the 
technology and innovation process. 
Therefore, instead of an erosion we are 
facing a transformation of state 
capacities in technology and inno-
vation policy. 
However, in the end one has to 
roughen up this far too pretty picture 
in at least two respects. 
The new concepts and instruments 
cannot be analyzed as a radical new 
beginning or a clear break with former 
patterns of research and technology 
policy but instead are incrementally 
and sometimes inconsistently fit into 
existing and persisting ones. The per-
sistence of classical patterns of inno-
vation policy-making is blatant espe-
cially in the case of large technologies 
(in Germany for instance this is seen in 
the public support of Transrapid, space 
technologies or traffic telematics) 
which still remain an important focal 
point of technology policy. Johannes 
Weyer has rightly stressed that in these 
cases even today the state operates 
“with the classical repertoire of direct 
intervention, direct project promotion, 
market foreclosure, promotion of 
public champions and the exercise of 
buyers’ and buying power (2004: 293; 
2005)”. 
Moreover, the new adjustments of 
technology and innovation policy can 
cause new problems, that might arise 
as a result thereof. A regional-oriented 
technology policy which aims at pick-
ing winners may foster the develop-
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ment of some selected regions but at 
the same time suppresses the devel-
opment of other regions or innovative 
enterprises that are located outside the 
target region (Dohse 2005). The cur-
rently strong orientations of technol-
ogy and innovation programs and pub-
lic initiatives to restructure the public 
research and science system by inten-
sifying networking between academia 
and industry, stimulating technology 
transfer and the short-term benefits of 
scientific research for economic deve-
lopment, may cause similar problems. 
They tend to underestimate that the 
further development – especially of 
new science-based and knowledge-
intensive technologies – will depend 
exceedingly on the contributions of 
pure basic research for a long period 
(Meyer-Krahmer 2000). Finally, all the 
readjustments of technology and inno-
vation policy so far have hardly made a 
contribution to really integrating and 
institutionalizing the resources and 
actors of public protest and contro-
versy regarding new technologies into 
the patterns of political negotiations 
and decision-making. Of course, poli-
cymakers are strongly dependent on 
external expertise and consultations 
with private actors. However, at the 
top the negotiating state still remains a 
corporatist state. Decisions of general 
importance are usually negotiated with 
large enterprises, the federations of 
industries and the federations of sci-
ence in closed sessions (Saretzki 1997; 
Dolata 2003: 265-303). 
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